信息不对称是风险投资过程中最显著的特点之一，风险企业在接受风险资本后的运行过程中的信息不对称将产生道德风险问题。它将直接导致风险企业家的消极怠工、在职消费以及滥用资本、过度投资等问题，严重威胁和损害风险投资家的利益。防范和控制道德风险问题关系到风险资本的安全及使用效率，也是风险投资家和理论界关注的对象。
    本文基于现代契约理论，并结合对风险投资特点的分析，提出了构建和设计一种合理的投资契约是防范和控制道德风险的必然途径。富于弹性和灵活的契约机制是投资契约设计的主要内容，对道德风险的发生起到了积极的防范和控制作用，而投资契约保护性条款的设计则对道德风险的发生起到了法律上的震慑作用，并可弥补风险投资家因道德风险的损失。这两方面构成了投资契约设计的主要内容。
    论文通过对产生道德风险的相关因素的研究，明确了契约机制的设计途径，即增强风险资本的抗风险能力、设计风险企业家的报酬激励制度以及对风险企业采取合理的干预决策。风险资本的抗风险能力可以通过对风险资本的投入形态和投入方式的设计得到增强。信息不对称状况和项目质量状况是决定风险资本投入形态的主要因素。较之一次性投入，分阶段投资是风险资本理想的投入方式，更能降低道德风险和激励风险企业家。同时，基于分段投资的期权特性，运用实物期权理论研究了分段投资中再投资的时机问题。在风险企业家的报酬激励设计上，对比了主流支付结构和即时支付结构在提高风险企业家的努力水平上的效果，分析了经理期权制度的激励机制和创新功能，提出了一种股权和期权混合的报酬制度。在风险企业的干预上，分析了风险投资家的干预对于防范和控制道德风险的积极作用以及实施干预的条件，研究了不同资本形态下风险投资家的干预决策。
    作为风险投资契约的必要组成部分，保证性条款设计上主要考虑了契约的法律功能，要求风险企业家就其经营条件和行为作出声明、承诺和保证。

关键词:风险投资信息不对称道德风险契约

    Information asymmetry is one of the most outstanding characters in venture capital investment, which will lead to moral hazard after venture entrepreneur accepts the venture capital. Moral hazard can cause many problems which will threaten and impair the benefit of the venture capitalists seriously, for example negative  work,  excessive  consumption  on  work,  misusing  capital,  excessive investment and so on. How to prevent and control moral hazard is a key to increase the security and efficiency of venture capital, and it's also research object to the venture capitalists and the scholars in the theoretical field.
    In this paper, we conclude that designing a investment contract is essential to prevent and control moral hazard according to the modern contract theory, and the design mainly contain the design of contract mechanisms and the design of guaranteed item. By the analysis of the factors producing the moral hazard and research on the characters of information asymmetry on the process of the venture capital  investment,  we  can  conclude  the  design  approaches  of  the  contact mechanisms, including strengthening the risk resistance of the venture capital, inspiriting the venture entrepreneur by income and the interference of the venture enterprises.
    The risk resistance of venture capital can be enhanced by designing the kind of venture capital and its investment way. Research shows that information asymmetry and the quality of the project are the main factors that decide the kind of venture capital. On the other hand, stage investment is a better investment way that can reduce the moral hazard and inspirit venture entrepreneur. Meanwhile, based on the analysis of the optional characters of stage investment, we can clarify the selection time of stage investment exercise the real option theory. Next, after comparing the incentive payment structure with the continuous payment structure and analyzing of the ESO, this paper gives a new inspirit system contained stock ownership and stock option. As to the interference on the venture enterprises, we conclude that interference can be help to prevent and control moral hazard because it can better the
condition of information asymmetry. Meanwhile, we analysis the condition of interference and venture capitalists' interfering decisions under various venture capital.

Keywords: Venture Capital  Information Asymmetry  Moral Hazard  Contract