摘要
    随着经济全球化的发展，世界范围内产业结构的调整加速，高新技术产业已经成为各国青睐的目标。特别是自20世纪40年代以来，风险投资在美国取得了巨大的成功，不仅取得了高额回报，同时也极大地促进了美国高科技成果的转化和加快产业化步伐，成为推动美国新经济发展的主要动力。如何通过风险投资发展我国的高新技术产业，对我国传统产业的升级改造以及经济增长方式的改变具有重要的意义。
    虽然有关方面大力倡导发展风险投资，但是长期以来，我国风险投资的发展状况并不尽如人意，存在一系列的问题，如投资效率低;资金规模小，资金来源渠道狭窄，国有资本占主导地位;风险投资经理市场没有建立起来，缺乏优秀的风险投资家;激励、约束机制相对缺乏，风险投资家报酬机制不合理;风险资本退出途径不顺畅，风险投资的配套法规，政策不健全等。
    本文研究发现，信息不对称导致风险投资中代理人道德风险问题，从而导致市场缺乏效率。本文运用信息经济学的相关理论，研究风险投资者、风险投资家与风险企业之间的委托一代理关系，以及道德风险的问题。对于风险投资道德风险问题，在以往的文献中已经提出了一些解决办法，如:分阶段注资、可转换优先股的使用、“棘轮”条件、风险企业管理层的期权安排以及风险企业管理层雇佣合同等。但是在实际运作过程中，上述部分解决办法在中国的特定环境下不能实施。本文解决的核心问题是信息技术对风险投资中信息不对称的作用，通过企业信息化来解决风险投资中道德风险，提高风险投资的运行效率。
    本文阐述了目前风险投资所存在的问题，指出道德风险是风险投资运行效率低下的主要原因之一。对风险投资中道德风险进行了详细的分析，并对道德风险的防范措施进行了总结，提出建立风险投资中道德风险的评价体系。最后对本文的研究进行了总结，指出了本文的不足并就将来的研究给出了一些建议。

关键词:风险投资，信息不对称，道德风险，风险评价体系

Abstract
    With the globalization of economy and the acceleration of industrial structure allover  the  world,  many  countries  have  been  paying  great  attention  to  the development of hi-tech- industry. From 40s of last century, the success of venture capital in America had promoted the transformation of the hi-tech and impulsed the economy of America. As for China, the development of venture capital has great influence on the development of hi-tech industry, the upgrade of conventional industries and the action of the mode of economy growth.
    The venture capital has some problems, such as low efficiency, little capital scale,  not building  manager  market  of venture  capital,  lacking  incentive& restraining mechanism, no smooth withdrawing channel of venture capital.
    By studying, we found that asymmetric information causes moral hazard in venture capital industry and make the venture capital industry develop inefficiently. In this article, information economics has been applied to the research of the game between investor and venture capitalist, and the moral hazard. On this issue, the resolutions have been mentioned in the past articles, such as investing stage by stage, the using of convertible preferred stock, the "pawl" condition, arrangement of venture  enterprise  management's  option  and  venture  enterprise  management's contract of employment etc.  But in the functioning of operation, the part of resolutions above-mentioned can not be put in practice in the unusual environment in China.  This article tries to study investor's agency venture due to asymmetric information and how to use advantages of information system to conquer agency risk, and stimulate the venture capital market and make the venture capital industry
develop high efficiently.
    This dissertation depicts the problem of venture investigation recently, and indicates that moral hazard is one of the main reasons of low efficiency in venture investigation. This paper analyzes the moral hazard in venture investigation and sumarizes the precautionary implements. Then it presents to build evaluation system for moral hazard in venture investigation. Lastly, it summarizes the research in this paper and points out some shortages, and then proposes several advices for future research
Key words:  Venture capital, Asymmetric information, Moral hazard, Risk
            evaluation system